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Each provides a generaI overview of  the contents and argument  of  the text and also 
singles out one or  two short, interesting sections (e.g., the master and slave section of  
the Phenomenology and the Being/Nothing/Becoming triad from the Science of Logic) for 
more detailed commentary. This is a happy solution to the vexing problem of  how to 
give beginners some sense o f  both the systematic scope and concrete riches of  Hegel's 
texts. Besides the Phenomenology, Science of Logic, Encyclopedia, and Philosophy of Right, 
Rockmore also discusses in some detail the Differenzschrift, which is justified by his 
historical and thematic focus. However, the decision to ignore Hegel's posthumously 
edited and published lectures on art, religion, the history of  philosophy, and the 
philosophy of  history, given their profound later influence, is less understandable in a 
work that tries to take account of  the historical influence of  Hegelianism. Rockmore 
provides a fine treatment of  the problematic "necessity" of  the movement f rom one 
"shape o f  consciousness" to the next in the Phenomenology--a process that he helpfully 
compares to the historical development from one scientific theory to the nex t - - and  a 
clear-headed discussion of  what "absolute knowledge" i s - -and is no t - - fo r  Hegel. 
The  brief chapter on the reception of  and reactions to Hegelianism over the past 
century and a half is largely successful. Rockmore's discussion of  Kierkegaard and 
Marx are models o f  concision and good sense and clearly demonstrate his more gen- 
eral claim concerning the pervasive influence of  Hegel. On the other hand, it is hard to 
see why Nietzsche is included in this chapter, and Rockmore's attempt to link Nietz- 
sche's rejection o f  the entire Western (Platonic) philosophical tradition to a rejection of  
Hegel is unconvincing. 
Inevitably, scholars will quarrel with specific points of  Rockmore's interpretation 
and will challenge claims made in passing (and, given the brevity of  this work, almost 
all of  the claims have to be made simply en passant). In its main lines, however, this work 
fully succeeds in accomplishing the difficult and unique task it sets for itself. Its broadly 
"historical" approach to the problem of  introducing readers to Hegel's thought is very 
much in "the spirit o f  Hegel" and is, I believe, preferable to other introductory strate- 
gies. There  is no other book quite like this in English, and for this reason alone Before 
and after Hegel can be recommended to anyone seeking entrance into what so often 
seems to be the self-enclosed and impenetrable Hegelian fortress. 
DANI EL BREAZEALE 
University of Kentucky 
Keith M. May. Nietzsche on the Struggle between Knowledge and Wisdom. New York: St. 
Martin's Press, 1993. Pp. xv + J93- Cloth, $49.95. 
This unusual  and thoughtful study, which is more a sustained Nietzschean meditation 
than a piece of  scholarship about Nietzsche, is inspired by an 1875 note referring to 
"the struggle between science and wisdom displayed in ancient Greek philosophy." As 
a classical philologist Nietzsche concluded that in the ancients wisdom once essentially 
pitted itself against knowledge. As a philosopher he argued that wisdom--personal,  
incomplete, perspectival, perhaps idiosyncratic--ought once again to challenge knowl- 
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edge (Wissenschaft, the stuff of  academia). May identifies with Nietzsche's post-Kantian 
redefinition of  the task of  thinking as the resolute interpretation of  being. He also 
identifies with the ancients', particularly the Presocratics', impulse to know and mea- 
sure the value o f  soul or  psyche. He argues, eruditely and succinctly, to the militantly 
Nietzschean conclusion that wisdom or strength of  soul surpasses knowledge in value, 
and tragedy and virtue as well. 
May brings to this conclusion the fervid belief in individuality that characterizes the 
creative artist, the one who crafts the aletheic Word where image and meaning embrace. 
This is the nineteenth-century cult of  genius again, plausible still, I suppose, for one like 
May who comes to Nietzsche and to argumentative philosophy from the literary domain. 
Yet his analysis o f  ancient literatures and philosophies is so clear and compelling, his 
taste for the central argument  in a writer so accurate, that one readily takes May as a 
philosopher, i.e., as one who speaks in the social domain of  public "truths" or  of  hypothe- 
ses that pass as tested and warranted. When he finally claims as his own the thesis of  the 
utterly individual nature of  truth and meaning, he seems to advance a notion of  truth so 
private and one o f  authority so elitist that they seem obnoxious. He is speaking in the 
voice o f  the Promethean artist, however, and assumes the unique authority of  
Heideggerean poet, the culture-founding primal speaker: My (personal) vision is truer, 
more steadfast than your (hopelessly plural) sciences and disciplines. 
May's argument  for this view is well-crafted. If, in the tradition that goes from 
Kant's phenomenalism to Nietzsche's perspectivism to the aestheticism of  the later 
Heidegger, there is no privileged moment where knowledge overlays reality, then 
knowledge, say as the assemblage of  academic domains of  discourse, is but a social 
creation, and objectivity disappears. I f  one stops here and privileges scepticism, the 
weak nihilism ensues which Nietzsche correctly diagnosed as the spiritual malady of  
late modernity. From the perspective of  will to power, however, public knowledge can 
still be "true" as an instrument, a tool used by the "strong soul" possessed of  personal 
wisdom. What is this use? As obstacle or challenge, it is the object of  Socratic logical 
skirmish. What is this controlling wisdom? "The quality is personal, or preferably, 
singular and consists in the persistent exploration of  one path. For example, Par- 
menides guides himself by a sort of  negative image of  the Way of  Truth,  an under- 
standing that culture is by definition truthless" (175). May's touchstone, oxymoronic to 
my mind, is personal truth. It smacks more of  Heidegger than of  Nietzsche, but it is 
Heidegger in plain English. 
This book is composed from diverse essays, some better than others. "Knowledge 
and Wisdom in the Tragic Age" explains Nietzsche's advance to the metaphysics of  will 
to power as a personal appropriation of  the legislative (rather than argued) insights of  
the Presocratics. From Anaximander he takes the view that the universe is ceaselessly 
undergoing alteration, from Heraclitus, the view that the universe is a "monster of  
energy." Nietzsche's metaphysics is Parmenidean in that it insists that nothing is imper- 
fect, since every passing shape is fettered to the whole. He could be said to follow 
Anaxagoras in that will to power universally imputes purposiveness or nonmechanical 
meaning to each constellation. Nietzsche's "wisdom" is as personal, selective, or stylis- 
tic, argues May, as that of  his sources. 
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May's essay on Socrates is similarly compelling. On the one hand, Socrates is pic- 
tured as pursuing thought  for its own sake, not the conclusions at which it arrives. On 
the other hand, and more importantly, he urges restraint of  the drive for knowledge, 
acknowledging the limitations of  its origin in social authority. Under  Socratic scrutiny, 
the social myth of  "expertise" is unmasked as the rule of  convention, sanctioned by 
merely local criteria and definitions. May's Socrates, whose wisdom rules his thirst for 
knowledge, is more a Heideggerean hero than the "monster of  reason" celebrated and 
denounced in Twilight of the Idols. 
May's chapter on Aristotle and Nietzsche is disappointing, working from the single 
point of  the externality of  Aristotle's first mover to what is moved. His interpretation of  
"Ariadne's Complaint," one of  the Dithyrambs of Dionysus, is haunting and evocative. 
Ariadne, the modern soul, trembles with anxiety over the thought of  a huntsman-god 
who has targeted her. The  god, says May, is our belongingness to nature; Ariadne's 
anxiety is caused by the delusion of  her independence, the failure to acknowledge that 
the god is internal to her. Cut free of  Christianity, argues May in Nietzsche's voice, 
immortality is not lost for soul; Ariadne is still supremely valuable, sought, because 
needed, by the god. 
This is a deep and erudite book, worthy of  a leisurely read by professional philoso- 
phers. Few will find its views correct, or easy to endorse, but most will find their 
automatic allegiance to public knowledge and the community of  the believers-and- 
scholars challenged. 
MICHAEL G. VATER 
Marquette University 
Robert W. Burch and Herman J. Saatkamp, editors. Frontiers in American Philosophy. 
Vol. I. College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1992. Pp. xx + 366. 
Cloth, $49.5 ~ . 
Based upon a major symposium at Texas A & M University in June,  1988, the publica- 
tion o f  this first o f  a promised two volumes of  proceedings in characterized by co- 
editor Herman Saatkamp as both a retrospective on "the origins and plurality of  the 
American intellectual heritage" and as a prospective "through the major developments 
presently shaping future philosophical inquiry in the United States" (ix). Groupings o f  
essays move from "Whitehead and Mead" to "Technology and the Public Good," to 
separate sections on "Mead" (again), "Royce: Hermeneutics, Loyalty, and Religion," 
and "Peirce: Unexplored Issues." A broad and fairly representative sampling of  Ameri- 
can philosophers is encompassed in these pages: from mainstream figures like Hilary 
Putnam, Joseph Margolis, and Nicholas Rescher; encompassing distinguished main- 
stays in the "American Philosophy" establishment, like John Lachs, Beth Singer, Don- 
ald Sherburne, and Charlene Seigfried; through elder statesmen and dons like H. S. 
Thayer  and the late Irwin Lieb; to a new generation of  American philosophers repre- 
sented by Kathleen Wallace and Vincent Colapietro. 
This is an unusual anthology, and may reveal even more about the current state of  
